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plain, highly categorical sentences. There is doubtless a certain utility in these accommodations to the intellectual infirmity and immaturity of the American undergraduate. The author also endeavors to render the approach to philosophy more attractive by introducing more geography than usual (which is a rather amusing idea), and by connecting the history of doctrines with political and literary history. The latter part of the program, however, does not come to much more than a thundering in the index. The book displays a certain amount of pedagogical ingenuity; but this does not compensate for the fact that its content, save in a few passages, seems purely a product of mechanical compilation or transcription, which gives small evidence of having really passed through the author's own mind and of having been thoroughly reflected upon and revitalized there. The great pedagogic problem, in relation to the history of philosophy, is to make these ancient doctrines and reasonings seem plausible, inevitable, and alive. In the present text-book that problem still remains far from a solution.

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A COMMENTARY ON HEGEL'S LOGIC. By J. M. E. McTaggart, D.Litt. Cambridge: University Press, 1910. Pp. xv, 311.

This latest book of Dr. McTaggart's supplements his previous works, "Studies in Hegelian Dialectic" and "Studies in Hegelian Cosmology"; for it contains a detailed exposition of the logical framework underlying the views advocated in those books. We here have, expressed with great lucidity and adorned by a style of admirable conciseness, the principal links in a chain of reasoning which, Dr. McTaggart thinks, is capable of proving "that all that exists forms a universe composed of individuals; that the universe and that each individual is an organic system; and that the relation which exists between the universe-system and the individual-systems is one of perfect harmony." And it is a fair deduction, he adds, that each individual is in harmony with all the other individuals. This much, according to Dr. McTaggart, the Hegelian logic (or some amended train of reasoning very similar to that actually elaborated by Hegel) can strictly prove. This statement, indeed, is by no means a full account of Dr. McTaggart's view of reality.

He holds, not merely that the universe is an organic system composed exclusively of individuals, each of which is in its turn an organic system, but also, among other things, that these individuals are each of them conscious spirits connected by relations exemplified, in ordinary experience, by love; and that the Hegelian logic can by itself prove as much as this he does not claim. But it must be observed that the relation which his further conclusions about the nature of reality, as set forth in his other books, bear to the argument developed in this book, is such that, if that argument is unsound, it is, on his own view, very unlikely that the other arguments supporting his further views will be tenable. If anyone doubts that "all that is real is rational and all that is rational real," or that nothing whatever exists except conscious spirits systematically related by their emotions, it is to the Hegelian Dialectic that Dr. McTaggart will in the last resort appeal in order to dissipate such doubts. The question whether the Hegelian dialectic is, on the whole, valid is thus one of great speculative moment. Moreover, it also has a certain practical importance. For if it is true that nothing exists except a harmony of conscious and loving spirits, then the universe is, if not perfectly good, at any rate a great deal better than it seems to be to large numbers of people; and thus the demonstration of the truth of this belief might, as Dr. McTaggart has pointed out, make a considerable difference to human happiness.

The demonstration, however, is not yet complete. Dr. McTaggart does not aim in this book at a full and strict deduction of the true nature of reality; his object is merely to expound the successive steps of the process by which Hegel thought that he had penetrated that nature. He carefully weighs the validity of Hegel's every step and explains its meaning. And although, in his opinion, most of the steps come successfully out of the test, he discovers certain defects. Of these the gravest are the breaks in the dialectic chain which he is forced to recognize in the categories of Pleasure, Casuality, and Life. To fill these gaps would require a larger reconstruction of the dialectic process than came within the scope of the present work; and accordingly Dr. McTaggart, while in various places substituting an argument of his own where Hegel's seems to him unsound, has left the chain incomplete in at least these three important respects. Further, he mentions two other points which Hegel

did not settle, and which require to be settled before the dialectic can be fully accepted. (1) The subject-matter of the dialectic is not 'all reality' in the widest sense of that phrase, but is only so much of reality as exists; it excludes, that is to say, all those things (if any there be) which, like propositions and possibilities, may be real, but are certainly non-existent. If Hegel had considered the question, he would probably, Dr. McTaggart thinks, have taken the view that nothing is real but the existent; but he did not consider it, and consequently his whole position is, we are told, both unjustified and rather vague. (2) The second point which, according to Dr. McTaggart, Hegel ought to have discussed, is the doctrine that when a thing stands in any relation to another thing, the fact that it stands in that relation is one of its qualities. This is a doctrine of far-reaching importance, and Dr. McTaggart considers that Hegel had no right to assume it, as he does, without attempting to prove it.

Evidently, then, since in commenting Hegel, it leaves defects such as these unremedied, this book must not be taken as an attempt to establish a system. Yet it would be a mistake to suppose that it therefore possesses a merely historical and expository interest. Where he does not correct it, Dr. McTaggart thinks that Hegel's argument is sound; and where he points out mistakes, but leaves them uncorrected, he makes it clear that he thinks the break in the chain capable of being remedied. The book is thus really a preliminary sketch of what its author thinks the right method of reaching ultimate truth about the universe. Its arguments, elaborate and ingenious though they are, will not, indeed, by themselves justify any reader, however much they may impress him, in concluding that the admission that something is (or, as Dr. McTaggart otherwise puts it, that there is such a thing as experience), necessarily implies that the category of the Absolute Idea completely expresses the nature of reality. This conclusion cannot be justified as long as the above-mentioned *lacunæ* remain. At the same time the portions of the argument now before us are of such a nature that a careful examination of them will enable the reader to form a tolerably good opinion as to the prospect of attaining ultimate truth by the Hegelian method. Such an examination, however, is a task beyond the limits of this review.

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